This paper analyses the role of political connections in the post-entry performance of private start-up companies in China. It documents robust evidence that political affiliation enhances firms' survival and growth prospects, even if politically neutral start-ups enjoy faster productivity improvements. In addition, the benefits of political connections are largely confined to firms associated with local or top level governments, and they are more pronounced in capital-intensive industries.
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Introduction
Uncertainty in the policy making process creates substantial transaction costs for firms (Williamson, 1991; Henisz and Zelner, 2004) . Consequently, business organisations engage in political behaviour to internalise these costs and influence the policy process in ways favourable to them. Corporate political strategies such as lobbying and party contributions are widely employed by US firms, and these have been the subject of many academic studies (e.g. Stratmann, 2003 and Drazen et al., 2007) . The political sophistication of large European firms and their role in shaping the EU policy agenda is also documented (Coen, 1997) .
The current paper is concerned with political strategies adopted by firms in China.
A significant number of private-owned enterprises adopt the so-called "red hat" strategy by seeking political affiliation with the Communist Party and various governmental entities. Some scholars see this strategy as a means of circumventing problems associated with the lack of secure property rights and institutional discrimination, such as the lending bias of China's state-dominated banking system against indigenous entrepreneurs (Li, 1999; Huang, 2003) , heavy government regulations and extralegal fees (Johnson et al, 2000; Guriev, 2004) . This view is consistent with the "helping hand" theory of government-business relationship (Che and Qian, 1998) . However, theory also predicts that government bureaucrats tend to be more interested in rent-seeking, extraction and political objectives rather than corporate efficiency and maximising firm value. This is known as the "grabbing hand" hypothesis (Shleifer and Vishny, 1998) .
Given that politics and business have always been interrelated, it is perhaps surprising to observe that there is a paucity of work analysing the corporate performance implications of political connections. The few studies in this area include Fisham's (2001) estimation of the value of political affiliations to firms in Indonesia and the analysis of Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee (2006) on the financing strategy of politically connected Indonesian firms. For Malaysia, Johnson and Milton (2003) The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to contribute to this sparse literature by evaluating the effects of political connections on the survival and growth prospects of newly formed private enterprises in China. Our study is based on more than 106,000 private firms that entered the market between 1999 and 2004, 23% of which are politically affiliated with government at some level. We argue that China is a particularly interesting country for studies of political connections and firm performance for three main reasons.
First, in spite of its ever-increasing importance to the economy in the post-reform era, the private sector had been lacking proper legal protection or even official recognition. It was not until 1999 that the National People's Congress introduced an amendment to the constitution stipulating that the non-state sector is an integral element of the socialist market economy. In a remarkable U-turn, the Communist Party is now actively encouraging domestic capitalists to join its ranks (Guiheux, 2006) . It is therefore interesting to see how this newfound alliance between the political elite and (some) private firms is shaping market dynamics in this important emerging economy.
Second, in spite of a centralised political system, China's process of economic liberalisation has been highly decentralised, with various levels of governments having autonomous policymaking powers within their jurisdictions. In this regard, it can reasonably be hypothesised that firms affiliated with higher levels of government (e.g. central and regional) are likely to enjoy better political protection, securer property rights and easier access to bank loans. However, as Li (1999) and Qian (2003) observed, although lower level (i.e. local) governments have less leverage to protect enterprises under their jurisdiction, they have more incentive to make them as efficient and profitable as possible. This is because under China's system of fiscal federalism, local governments have no subordinate governments to extract revenue from and their interests are sharply aligned with those of local businesses. The case of China thus offers useful variation in the type of political connections that can be exploited to identify heterogeneous relationships between political behaviour and economic performance. Third, China's WTO (World Trade Organisation) accession stipulates several compulsory provisions on government relationships (Li, 2003) , including the absence of discriminatory economic policy. In this respect, it is important to determine the extent to which political cronyism is distorting market mechanisms. If the business environment in the country is not providing a level playing field for all markets' participants, it is not only politically unaffiliated domestic firms that would be discriminated against. Foreign firms in China's trading partner countries are also going to loose out in light of China's ever-deeper integration into the world economy. Thus, a study of the business-politics nexus in China has wider implications beyond the narrow confines of the domestic political economy sphere.
Our econometric analysis yields five major conclusions: (i) political connections significantly enhance firms' survival prospects; (ii) conditional on survival, firm growth is faster for politically affiliated firms; (iii) conditional on survival, politically unaffiliated private firms perform better in terms of productivity growth; (iv) the benefits due to political connections are largely confined to firms associated with local and high levels of government; and (v) the effects of political connections are more pronounced in capital intensive industries where firms require a wider range of resources for their growth, and the "helping hand" of government is presumably needed more.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the evolution of private firms-government relationship in China. Section 3 presents the empirical model, and Section 4 describes the data set used in the analysis. The main findings of the paper are discussed in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
Private firms and the body politic in China
In the first decade of the reforms , the legal framework governing the private sector was rather shaky. Although private firms were accorded some official recognition -their existence was formally sanctioned in the 1982 Constitution -they were not viewed as an integral part of the economy (Young, 1989) and lacked genuine legal and property rights. This is perhaps best crystallised by Article 11 of the Constitution 4 which stipulates, "the state guides, assists and supervises the individual economy by administrative control." Furthermore, private firms were not allowed to hire more than eight workers (e.g. Li, 2007) , presumably because of Karl Marx's categorisation in Das Kapital of producers employing eight or more workers as exploitive capitalists (Guiheux, 2006 (Guiheux, 2006) . The country has indeed come a long way from the time of the Cultural revolution when entrepreneurs were prosecuted as "tails of capitalism" (Young, 1989) . However, in spite of improving legal protection for private firms, market-supporting institutions are still weak in China. Indeed, private entrepreneurs still suffer from political and institutional discrimination (Young 1995; Li et al., 2007) . Li et al (2006) documents evidence that private entrepreneurs' response to market and institutional failures is to engage in political behaviour-the strategy of "wearing a red hat". A study conducted in 2002 revealed that 80 percent of the entrepreneurs surveyed had become members of the party before starting a business (Guiheux, 2006) . Other ways entrepreneurs participate in politics include: serving as delegates in local or national People's Congresses, contesting elections for local administration posts and joining business associations that link the state and the private sector (Guiheux, 2006) . Part of the reason for joining the political hierarchy is easier 5 access to resources such as land and bank credit, information on regulations and new policies, and protection from competition (see for example Li et al., 2007 ).
Yet another way in which firms engage in political behaviour is affiliation with some level of government administration. A large number of private enterprises in China have political connections with governmental bodies whose functions include offering credit guarantees and political protection in return for "management fees" (Huang, 2003) .
Broadly speaking, firms can be politically affiliated with five different levels of government (e.g. Li, 2004) . These are (in decreasing order of hierarchy): central, provincial, prefecture, county and township (local) governments. The relationship between different levels of government has been shaped by the revenue sharing system (fiscal federalism). The system requires lower level governments to hand over a fixed amount of their revenue to the higher tier of government. Since township governments have no lower level governments from which to extract revenue, their main sources of income are the firms under their jurisdiction. Thus, it is expected that local governments have more incentive to support productive non-state enterprises. As Qian (2003) and Li (2004) observe, fiscal federalism has aligned the interests of local governments with local business, implying that it might pay-off for private firms to be affiliated with their local governments. However, it is also reasonable to suppose that firms associated with higher levels of government (i.e. central and provincial) are likely to enjoy better protection and more privileges e.g. access to export and import licences, favourable bank loans and lucrative public contracts.
There are those who fear that the alliance between business and the body politic is likely to foster rent seeking among entrepreneurs and cadres. This will reduce the competitiveness of the market. As Dickson (2003) argues, "red capitalists" have little incentive for structural changes that favour the private sector as a whole.
Econometric specification
In this section, we describe the empirical strategy to identify the effects of political behaviour on the post-entry performance of private firms in China. We estimate two types of models: a nonlinear model of the probability of firm exit and linear models 6 of firm and productivity growth. Firm growth is defined as employment growth, which is a standard measure in the industrial economics literature. As a measure of productivity, we consider total factor productivity because it is widely accepted to be the chief determinant of long-run growth.
Modelling the impact of political behaviour on firm survival:
We model the probability of firm exit using a hazard rate specification. The hazard or the probability of exit for firm i in period t, conditional on having survived up to that point is expressed as ( )
where ) (t h o is the baseline hazard. We choose a flexible specification for the baseline hazard and employ the Cox proportional hazard model, which imposes a proportional characteristic-specific shift on the baseline hazard.
In the above equation, P is a vector of 3 binary variables indicating the government level (high, middle and local) the firm is affiliated with. Start-ups without political connection are the base group. D is a set of time, sectoral and regional dummies and X is a vector of control variables. In line with the empirical literature (see Geroski, 1995) we include firm size (measured by employment), age and productivity as control variables. It appears to be a stylised fact that larger, older and more efficient plants have better survival prospects than smaller, younger and inefficient ones. We also hypothesise that firms that are export oriented, enjoy access to finance and are engaged in innovative activity, have lower likelihood of market exit. The vector X also includes three industry level variables, namely industry exit and entry rates and industry concentration. In all cases, lagged values of the covariates are used to mitigate concerns about endogeneity. Table 1 gives the precise definition of the variables used in the econometric analysis.
Another source of concern in the estimation of hazard models is the issue of unobserved heterogeneity. As shown by Lancaster (1990) , unobserved heterogeneity, if neglected, would bias the proportionate response of the hazard to variation in each regressor at any survival time. For this reason, we estimate the hazard model with unobserved heterogeneity that follows a gamma distribution.
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The impact of political affiliation on firm and productivity growth:
In order to isolate the impact of political affiliation on firm growth, we estimate the following model:
The dependent variable Y denotes either firm (employment) growth or total factor productivity growth, P and D are defined as in Equation (1), Z is a vector of covariates hypothesised to impact on firm growth, f is a term capturing firm-specific heterogeneity and ε is a random error term. In the above model, Z consists of exporting intensity, innovation intensity, age, access to finance, initial size / productivity and industry concentration.
There is a large body of empirical evidence that finds firm (productivity) growth has a negative relationship with initial size (productivity), suggesting convergence in firm size (e.g. Geroski, 1995) . The positive correlation between performance and exporting has been widely documented across a number of countries, including China (see Kraay, 1999) . The growth enhancing effects of innovation and labour quality have also been recognised in the literature (e.g. Gort et al, 1993 and Jovanovic, 1982) . By contrast, higher market concentration is generally believed to have a detrimental impact on firm performance. The finance-growth nexus is well researched in the economic literature (Levine, 2005) . Some theoretical models predict that firms with debt contracts tend to grow faster than otherwise similar firms (e.g. Aghion et al, 1999) . In these models, debt is hypothesised to reduce the amount of free cash to managers, giving them the incentive to reduce managerial slack and seek innovative ways to boost efficiency.
A potentially serious estimation problem is that the growth variables are, by definition, only observed for firms that have survived up to a particular point in time. It is therefore important to correct for selection bias due to survivorship. A prominent method for correcting selection bias is due to Heckman (1976) . However, this technique does not deliver consistent estimators in panel data settings. Fortunately, Wooldridge (1995) has extended Heckman (1976)'s method to linear panel data models, and we use this extended estimator to identify the selectivity-corrected effects of political behaviour on 8 firm growth and performance. The variables included in the selection equations are the same as those used in the survival model described above.
Recall that in the baseline model the political connection variables are lagged by one period so that they are predetermined with respect to the growth variables.
Nevertheless, we also investigate the merits of a GMM estimator that explicitly controls for the potential endogeneity of political connections. To this end, we made an exploratory analysis on the determinants of political connection. The marginal effects from two probit regressions are reported in the Appendix. We first estimate a model with firm level variables only, and the results suggest that politically affiliated firms tend to be larger at birth, have higher initial productivity and enjoy greater access to finance. These firm level variables in the probit regressions cannot serve as exogenous instruments since they are also part of the set of control variables in the growth regressions. When we next add a variety of regional and industrial characteristics to the model, the predictive power of the probit model increased significantly (to nearly 80% correct predictions). The regression estimates show that firms in a region with greater financial development and competition, presence of lawyers and intellectual property rights are less likely to engage in political behaviour. At the industry level, the share of the private sector has a negative relationship with the propensity of start-ups to join the political bandwagon. We employ these regional and industry characteristics as exogenous instruments for the political connection variables in the GMM estimations and ascertain their validity using the Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions.
Database description
Our econometric analysis draws on the Annual Report of Industrial Enterprise
Statistics compiled by the National Statistical Bureau of China (NSB). The report covers the population of state-owned enterprises and all non-state firms with an annual turnover of over five million Renminbi (just above $600,000). It is estimated that the firms contained in the data set account for about 85-90% of total output in most industries. The 9 NSB performs several logic tests to ensure the accuracy of the information in the report and identify illogical data.
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The data set includes information on firm ownership structure, industry affiliation, geographic location, establishment year, employment, gross output, product innovation, R&D, value-added, net fixed assets, exports, R&D and employee training expenditures.
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The data set available to us spans the period 1999 to 2005, and comprises more than 1.3 million firm-year observations. It is worth noting that we used the whole sample to construct industry-level variables (e.g. industry entry and exit rates). However, in view of the objective of this paper, the econometric work is confined to the new, private, domestic-owned enterprises that entered the market. The NSB assigns to each firm in the database a categorical variable indicating ownership status. Nevertheless, it is also possible to construct a continuous measure of ownership composition from the database by looking at the fraction of paid-in capital contributed by state, private and foreign investors. Using this measure of ownership, we define a firm as being private if it is not in receipt of any state funds or foreign investment and private individuals are majority investors in the firm.
A firm is defined to be a new entrant at time t if its establishment year is given as time t and it is observed in the database for the first time at time t. This tight definition helps avoid measurement error problems in the establishment year variable. A nice feature of the database is that it maintains a unique enterprise identifier irrespective of the dynamics of ownership change. This feature is useful when it comes to distinguishing private firms that are liquidated (i.e. exited the market) and those that have experienced ownership change (e.g. acquired by foreign investors). A firm is designated to have exited the market at time t+1 if it is observed at the time t or earlier, but not in subsequent periods.
We identified 106,718 private entrants over the period 1999-2004 that have the necessary information for econometric estimation. Some quarter of a million observations on these firms provide the basis of our analysis. Table 1 gives the definition of the variables used in the analysis along with some summary statistics, while Table 2 tabulates the frequency distribution of entry by level of political affiliation and industry. About 23% of new entrants are politically affiliated, and more than half of these are associated with local governments.
Main findings
Does political affiliation affect firms' survival probability? Table 3 reports the econometric estimates from the proportional Cox hazard model with unobserved heterogeneity. Reassuringly, the coefficients on the control variables of the hazard model are broadly consistent with expectations. For example, larger, more productive and innovative firms enjoy higher survival probabilities and firms in highly concentrated industries face higher likelihood of exit. Also export activity and access to external finance enhances firms' survival probability.
The importance of political affiliation for the survival prospect of firms can be seen from the magnitude of the hazard ratio coefficients given in the second column of Table 3 . A firm that is affiliated with a high level of government (i.e. central and provincial) faces a hazard rate that is only 62.6% of the hazard faced by a firm without political association. The benefits due to affiliations with local and middle level governments are also positive and economically significant. Figure 1 shows the estimated hazard lines by level of political connections, and it is evident that firms without political affiliation face higher probability of exit. Results in Table 3 indicate an inverted-U shaped relationship between the level of government affiliation and its impact on firm survival. This is also demonstrated in Figure 1 , which also shows that this inverted U-shaped relationship persists over time. Start-ups associated with higher levels of government benefit the most, followed by those affiliated with local governments, with middle level governments conferring the least advantage on their protégées. This is in line with the conjecture discussed in Section 2. Incidentally, the four curves in Figure 1 appear to be parallel, suggesting that the proportionality assumption underlying the Cox hazard model is quite plausible in our context. Finally, it is worth noting that the survival effects of political affiliations are more pronounced in capital-intensive industries.
Perhaps not surprisingly, in a labour-abundant country like China, the "helping hand" of 11 government is more effective in sectors where access to capital is relatively more important.
It is a stylised fact that new entrants are exposed to high risk of exit, especially in the first post-entry year. As Geroski (1995) put it, "the most palpable consequence of entry is exit". Influential theoretical models such as Javanovic (1982) and Pakes and Ericson (1998) predict that firms' growth and survival performance depend on expectations about their own efficiency and the uncertainty associated with this expectation. Having entered the market with some prior belief about their performance, start-ups continuously update this belief based on their observed post-entry efficiency.
Depending on their updated knowledge and the level of uncertainty they face, economically rational firms decide whether to grow, decline or exit the market. In light of this discussion, a plausible channel through which political connections may help enhance firms' survival prospects is by reducing the uncertainty regarding the future. Table 4 reports the selection-bias corrected econometric estimates from the firm growth model. Conditional on survival, smaller firms tend to grow faster, rejecting Gibrat's Law and suggesting convergence in firm size. Exporting intensity, access to finance and innovation all have a positive impact on employment growth. In contrast, higher product market concentration and firm age have adverse growth effects.
Firm growth and political behaviour
In line with the results from the survival regressions, we uncover evidence that political affiliation with higher levels of government is most beneficial for the post-entry growth of start-ups. Controlling for a host of variables affecting employment growth and survivorship bias, we find that firms in capital (labour) intensive sectors that are affiliated with a central or provincial government grow 3.4 (2.5) percentage points faster than politically neutral firms. Affiliation with local governments also confers distinct, albeit less marked, advantage on firm growth. By contrast, the growth benefits associated with middle level of governments fall short of statistical significance.
This finding of positive correlation between political behaviour and start-ups growth is consistent with theoretical models that postulate internal uncertainty as a key driver of firm growth. Firms that receive political protection and all the attendant benefits 12 in terms of access to resources get positive signals about their future prospects and grow larger as a result. On the other hand, because of greater uncertainty regarding their future, it takes longer for start-ups without political masters to determine their optimal firm size.
Consequently, their post-entry growth rate tends to be lower than that of otherwise similar "red hat" firms.
Does the productivity of politically affiliated firms grow faster? Table 5 reports estimates from the productivity growth model. The most striking finding is that, conditional on survival and a number of control covariates; private firms without political affiliations exhibit higher productivity growth than firms with political connections. The total factor productivity growth of start-ups affiliated with central and provincial (middle level) governments is, on average, 1.7 (2.37) percentage points lower than "pure" private firms. It is also interesting to note that the productivity growth differential between start-ups with and without political behaviour is smallest for firms affiliated with local governments. In other words, amongst politically connected firms, those affiliated to local government enjoy the highest productivity growth. This is consistent with the notion that China's system of fiscal federalism has been more successful in aligning local business interests with those of local government than with those of higher levels of government. Alternatively, this finding can also be explained by the fact that local government has fewer firms per head under their protection, and might as a result be able to provide effective assistance conducive to efficiency improvement.
A final explanation could be that since local government bureaucrats are subject to less frequent rotations than provincial or prefecture officials, their decision making process is subject to less acute time inconsistency problem (Huang, 2003) .
Conclusion2
This paper sought to understand the role of political connections on the post-entry performance of private start-up companies in China. It documents robust evidence that political connections enhance firms' growth and survival prospects, even if politically neutral start-ups enjoy faster efficiency improvements. So more than a quarter of a century after Deng Xiaoping's famous pronouncement that the colour of the cat does not 13 matter as long as it catches mice, it seems that the cat in a red hat is somewhat more privileged than the one without.
Assessing the aggregate ramifications of political cronyism in China is beyond the scope of this paper. However, in view of our finding that private firms with no political ties tend to exhibit faster productivity growth and yet are more likely to exit the market, it is safe to conjecture that the close association between the state and a segment of the business community is leading to sub-optimal resource allocation in the economy by interfering with the process of market selection. Growing calls for a level playing field are likely to be heard in the future, though almost certainly not from the red capitalists who appear to thrive in the current political economic milieu. Table 2 Entry by private firms in the Chinese manufacturing sector, 1999-2004: Frequency distribution by political affiliation and industry a. Asymptotic t-statistics are given in parentheses b. significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
c. All specifications include sectoral, regional and time dummies d. All regressors are lagged by one period.
23 Table 5 Productivity growth and political affiliation 
